



California Sciences Institute

Keynote

Where do enterprise protection
and digital forensics converge?
AND


Where do they diverge?

Computer Forensics Show – Nov 1, 2010

Dr. Fred Cohen
President - California Sciences Institute
CEO – Fred Cohen & Associates



Outline





- Digital forensics:
 - What happened?
 - To an appropriate legal standard!

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
- Enterprise protection:
 - Assure utility of content
 - To management specified tolerance





- Law enforcement
- Lawyers and Judges
- Corporate counsel
- Electronic discovery
- Experts / researchers

- Chief security officers
- Network security folks
- CISOs
- Experts / researchers






Your speaker

- CEO - Fred Cohen & Associates / President CalSci
 - Enterprise information protection architecture
 - Digital forensics for (usually high-valued) legal cases
 - 501(c)3 research and educational institution
 - M.S. Advanced Investigation / Ph.D. Digital Forensics
- B.S. EE (C-MU '77), M.S. Info Sci (Pitt '81), Ph.D. EE (USC '86)
- >30 years of information protection R&D, design, engineering, testing, implementation, operation, etc.
- >20 years since first digital forensics case
- POST certified instructor in digital forensics, Guest lecturer FLETC, PMTS Sandia National Labs, etc.
- >>100 peer reviewed publications, many conference talks, ...




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
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




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
Enterprise information protection






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






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Outline – Where worlds collide




- Digital forensics:
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- Enterprise protection:
 - Assure utility of content
 - To management specified tolerance





Unfortunately... not the same

- Assure utility of content
 - Keep some of it
 - Tell less of it
 - Get rid of some of it
 - Limit costs/complexity
 - Perfect = enemy of good
- Management tolerance
 - What's important?
 - How important?
 - To the business!!!
- What happened
 - All that happened
 - Nothing that didn't
- Legal standard
 - Testimony / expert reports are NOT internal reports
 - Chain of custody and depend on it for business use
 - Reliable methods properly applied



Case example 1

- R&D effort in ~2000
- Very few records of effort were kept
- Executives found guilty of frauds unrelated to this issue in early 2000s
- Migration from one archive to another in 2004 (tossed old)
- Law suit in 2008
- Order to preserve records from 2000
- Records mostly gone by 2008
- R&D largely undocumented
- Select emails recovered by individual workers

The courts and forensics experts have to sort this all out



Case example 2

- Activities took place in early 2000s
- Several large ISPs who don't keep old records
- Anonymizer service with contracts
- Postings to Internet forums and private records as evidence
- Legal case in 2008/9
- Party apparently reading opponent's email with lawyers
- Subpoenas yielded partial information
- “Experts” posted “evidence” and findings to Internet forums before court

A media circus resulted and the case went a different way



Case example 3

- Issue from Dec 1999
- Y2K backups meticulously made
- Corporate backups kept in basement of World Trade Center
- 9/11/2001 happens
- Business continuity adequate to keep going
- Legal case in 2003+
- Records subpoenaed
- Unfortunately...

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- Fragments of data from around the World used in case
- Couldn't reliably establish events

Guilty verdict overturned and directed not guilty issued



Case example 4

- The “WayBack” machine
 - Used to see what was apparently on the Web in the past
 - Some folks see an apparent violation of a contract, etc.
 - It's “evidence” of wrongdoing!!!
 - They sue thinking they have the smoking gun
- Legal cases have had rulings both ways!!!
 - The WayBack Machine is NOT reliable on its face
 - BUT... some of it is reasonably reliable for some purposes...
 - You NEED and expert to tell
 - And to testify!

The legal standard is very different from the Internet one



Qualifications differences

- Certified [Encase / FTK / whatever] examiners
 - 5-day course and test
- Familiar with corporate information security
 - Operate enterprise defensive systems
 - “Catch” folks to support HR actions
- Any good as digital forensics experts?

The legal and corporate standards are very very different

- Legal “experts” need knowledge, skills, experience, training, and education
- Ph.D. in relevant field
- Publish peer-reviewed relevant research in journals and books
- Reliable scientific methods properly applied



- Electronic discovery
 - A now necessary and undesired expense and risk
 - Mediated discovery could reduce costs
 - We could negotiate with a non-lawyer
 - It could reduce risks
 - If we fool the one person we win
 - Bribes have worked before
- Legal issues (mediated)?
 - Self-incrimination
 - Discovery discretion away from judges
 - Lose right to confidential and independent experts
 - Too few mediators exist
 - Potential for abuse
 - Forces counsel to reveal strategies
 - May actually cost more

The legal and corporate views may be directly at odds



Some other differences

- Often legal to search without substantial limit
- Often actions based on unrelated data (fire them for something else)
- DMCA permits reverse engineering (research)
- Minimal effort to get to a decision is often desired
- Executive management decides what to do and often acts in their own best interest without scrutiny / opposition
- Searches almost always require warrants and are limited in scope
- Process limits actions to relevant issues
- DMCA prohibits reverse engineering in forensics
- High dollar valued cases are often fully litigated
- Opponents fight it out, judge rules in the public interest, deep scrutiny

The two worlds have very different rules and constraints



Some things to think about

- This talk does not provide answers
 - As a keynote - it asks questions
- The talks in this conference will help to get at many of the issues and answers
 - What are the tensions between “security” and “forensics” in the corporate World
 - Intrusion detection and response vs. attribution to a legal standard
 - Electronic discovery – a huge deal – is it one that can be left to “mediators”?
 - Who/what is an “expert” suitable to the corporate vs. legal domain?



Listen carefully...

- The same words mean different things in the legal and corporate context - examples:
 - Forensics (legal) is NOT forensics (corporate)
 - Search (legal) is NOT search (corporate)
- The standards are very different
 - Experts have very different standards
 - Tools have very different standards
 - Evidence had very different standards
- Corporations rarely use science for security
 - Courts rely on scientific studies and bases – corporate “security” rarely uses science at all!



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Thank You



<http://calsci.org/> - calsci at calsci.org
<http://all.net/> - fc at all.net