Title: TOWARDS A GAME THEORY MODEL OF INFORMATION WARFARE
Subject: TOWARDS A GAME THEORY MODEL OF INFORMATION WARFARE
Author(s): David A. Burke
Abstract: The production and exchange of information has become a central activity in today’s global economy. Protecting and securing information as it travels over the vast, mostly public Internet has emerged as perhaps the premiere issue of the Information Age. Thus, the attack and defense of electronic information has formed an entirely new kind of conflict – information warfare. Information warfare is still in its infancy. Government and private organizations alike poorly understand this ubiquitous form of confrontation. Nevertheless, they cannot avoid devoting ever increasing portions of their budgets to information warfare. Both obtaining other’s information and defending one’s own information have become critical economic decisions. As with any economic decision, the benefits (i.e. utility) must be commensurate with the resources expended to acquire those benefits. Game theory could provide a new method for analyzing information warfare. The strategic and tactical decisions that face information warriors are essentially economic in nature. Does the value of the information being defended or sought justify the cost of protecting or seeking it? Game theory could contribute to a better understanding of information warfare strategy and implications. The application of game theory to information warfare is a complex and massive undertaking. This study is but the first step in exploring the full ramifications of this potential application of game theory.